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The United States has long faced a history of accidents relating to alcohol-impaired driving.  
In order to combat the problem, Congress enacted a federal statute in 1984 directing states to raise 
the in-state drinking age to twenty-one or, as a consequence, receive less highway funding.1  The 
aim was to stop drivers who were younger than the requisite drinking age from crossing state 
borders to drink where the legal drinking age was lower.2  According to Congress, and with the 
Supreme Court’s stamp of approval, the statute was enacted as a means for states to secure federal 
funds by keeping their highways safe.3   
Today, all fifty states have enacted laws that prohibit motorists from driving with a blood 
alcohol concentration (“BAC”)4—defined as the level of alcohol in the blood—that exceeds 
0.08%.5  Even with these laws in place, drunk driving is the leading cause of highway deaths,6 
killing more than 10,000 individuals in alcohol-impaired driving crashes per year.7  Of all motor 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. cum laude, 2015, Rutgers University.  I would 
like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Brian Murray, for his guidance and support in the writing of this 
Comment. 
1 23 U.S.C. § 163 (2018); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).  
2 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09.  
3 Id. at 208.  
4 ROBERT L. DUPONT, THE SELFISH BRAIN: LEARNING FROM ADDICTION 131 (1997). (“When a person drinks alcohol, 
the alcohol is distributed . . . evenly throughout the person’s body. . . The biggest factors governing BAC, however, 
are not gender or weight, but how much a person drinks and how long after the drink is consumed the BAC is checked.  
This is because the liver is efficient at metabolizing alcohol.  The liver can break down one drink of alcohol (0.5 
ounce) into carbon dioxide and water in about an hour and a half.”)  Id. at 132.  
5 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016); see also Editorial Staff, Legal BAC Limits in Different 
States, Counties, & Cities, https://www.alchol.org/dui/bac-limits/ (last updated July 18, 2019).  Some states are 
considering enacting a lower BAC limit—0.05%—with Utah leading the way by already adopting such a measure.  
Angie Schmitt, Other States Should Copy Utah’s New Drunk Driving Rule, STREETSBLOG USA, (Jan. 4, 2019) 
https://usa.streetsblog.org/2019/01/04/why-other-states-should-copy-utahs-new-drunk-driving-rule/. 
6 Becky Ianotta, New NHTSA Numbers Show Drunk Driving Still the Leading Cause of Highway Deaths, MOTHERS 
AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.madd.org/press-release/new-nhtsa-numbers-show-drunk-
driving-still-the-leading-cause-of-highway-deaths/.  
7 Alcohol-Impaired Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSPS. SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812630.  
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vehicle accidents, 29% are the result of alcohol-impaired driving incidents.8  These statistics reflect 
the problem this country faces in its uphill battle to combat drunk-driving related incidents.   
The statistics also provide the underlying reasons for why most states have enacted 
“implied consent laws.”  These laws pronounce that drivers agree to submit to chemical tests of 
the breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content if asked to do so by a law 
enforcement officer, just by virtue of driving in that state.9  While the purpose of such laws is to 
impose penalties on drivers who refuse to undergo testing, the laws may nonetheless violate the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches of the person. Drivers are faced 
with a conundrum, because while they deserve their constitutionally protected right to be free from 
warrantless searches, implied consent laws genuinely leave them with minimal options. 
This Comment addresses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mitchell v. Wisconsin,10 
which held that police officers may “almost always” order a warrantless blood test under a statute 
like the ones mentioned above, to measure an unconscious driver’s BAC without offending the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches of their person.  Part II of this 
Comment will describe the history of driving under the influence (“DUI”) or while intoxicated 
(“DWI”) laws11 and the reasons behind their implementation.  Part II will also address the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of the serious issue that the United States has faced with impaired driving.   
Part III will then provide an objective overview of cases that were decided before Mitchell 
and their implications on criminal procedural law under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  
Part IV will comprehensively break down the split in Mitchell, focusing primarily on the plurality, 
 
8 Id.  
9 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2166; Implied Consent Law, DRIVERSED.COM, 
https://driversed.com/resources/terms/implied_consent_law.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).  
10 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).  
11 These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this Comment for brevity. 
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written by Justice Alito, and the dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor.  Part V pays special 
attention to how Mitchell fits with past precedent, if at all.  It begs to answer the question of why 
there was a sudden need for change in DUI law standing doctrine and how the opinion should be 
applied moving forward.  In total, this Comment will argue that the Supreme Court should either 
come forward with a bright-line rule using the traditional analysis focusing on the exigent 
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment, or state that DUI cases are subject to a public 
policy reasonableness standard—the governmental need of ensuring safe roads.  By resting 
Mitchell on two rationales, lower courts will struggle to determine the parameters and limits of the 
decision, thereby possibly jeopardizing Fourth Amendment protections as a whole.  
II. Historical Background of DUI Laws and Their Significance 
In the United States today, one person dies nearly every 50 minutes because of a motor 
vehicle crash involving an alcohol-impaired driver, which amounts to 30 people per day.12  Over 
10,000 people are killed in alcohol-impaired driving crashes per year.13  It is estimated that 
accidents attributable to alcohol-impaired drivers annually impose costs upward of $37 to $44 
billion a year.14  Furthermore,  the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) statistics reflect that 
over one million drivers were arrested for DUI in 2018.15  Yet, this pales in comparison to the 112 
million adults in America who self-report episodes of alcohol-impaired driving each year.16 
 
12 Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv_factsheet.html (citing Alcohol-Impaired 
Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (Oct. 2017), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812450). 
13 Alcohol-Impaired Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (Oct. 2017), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812450.  
14 Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Medical or Recreational Marijuana and Drugged Driving, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 453, 465 (2015); 
Drunk Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving 
(citing a 2010 study).  
15 Estimated Number of Arrests, 2018 Crime in the United States, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION: UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTING (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/table-29. 
16 DUI Statistics, BACTRACK, https://www.bactrack.com/blogs/expert-center/35040645-dui-statistics (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2019). 
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A. Congress and the States’ Attempt to Remedy the Overarching Issue 
Congress has long recognized the need to combat the problems created by alcohol-impaired 
drivers.  “Alcohol impairs balance, motor coordination, decision-making . . . [and] produces 
detectable memory impairments beginning after just one or two drinks.”17  DWI and DUI laws 
were enacted to directly combat this problem.  Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking 
Age Amendment of 1984,18 which authorized the Secretary of Transportation to “withhold a 
percentage of . . . federal highway funds from states in which the purchase or public possession of 
any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than 21 years of age is lawful.”19  Since then, all 
states have endorsed 21 years of age as the legal drinking age and 0.08% as the BAC limit.20  Utah 
has taken an initiative and recently lowered its BAC maximum threshold to 0.05%.21  The resulting 
statistics from these efforts show that drunk-driving fatalities have decreased by 48%,22 and drunk-
driving fatalities for motorists under the age of 21 have decreased by 80%.23  Yet the problem, 
highlighted by the aforementioned statistics, is nowhere near solved. 
States have gone even further and have enacted implied consent laws—which require 
“motorists, as a condition of operating a vehicle within the states, to consent to BAC testing if they 
are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”24  These laws also call 
 
17 Aaron M. White, What Happened? Alcohol, Memory Blackouts, and the Brain, 27 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 186–
96 (2003) (emphasis added). 
18 23 U.S.C.S. § 158 (2018).  
19 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).  
20 Editorial Staff, Legal BAC Limits in Different States, Counties, & Cities, ALCOHOL.ORG, 
https://www.alcohol.org/dui/bac-limits/ (last updated December 18, 2019). 
21 Nicole Nixon, Utah First in the Nation to Lower its DUI Limit to .05 Percent, NPR, 
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/26/679833767/utah-first-in-the-nation-to-lower-its-dui-limit-to-05-percent (last visited 
November 7, 2019). 
22 Drunk Driving Fatality Statistics, FOUND. FOR ADVANCING ALCOHOL RESP., 
https://www.responsibility.org/alcohol-statistics/drunk-driving-statistics/drunk-driving-fatality-statistics/ (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2019).  
23 Id. 
24 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019); see also State v. Entrekin, 47 P.3d 336, 338 (Haw. 2002); 
People v. Harris, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 2010 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2015). 
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for significant consequences, varying statewide, if and when motorists withdraw consent.  The 
most typical punishment is an immediate suspension or revocation a motorist’s license.25  Refusal 
may also be used as evidence in subsequent criminal prosecution.26  The statistics show the need 
for states to keep their roads safe, and the states have tried to combat the problem accordingly.  
B. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Problem 
The Supreme Court has also recognized drunk driving as a significant interest.27  Because 
of the “vital public interest” in highway safety,28 states have not only been tasked with removing 
unsafe drivers (i.e. drunk drivers) from the road, but also to collect evidence that will stand up in 
the court of law.  Law enforcement officers must be able to test BAC accurately enough to be 
admitted into evidence in a court proceeding.29  One of the principal methods in BAC testing is a 
roadside breathalyzer, which is usually administered before an arrest is made.30  Breathalyzer tests 
are the most efficient methods of testing BAC content.31  They also tend to be relatively accurate 
and extremely reliable in capturing BAC evidence because federal standards require such.32  After 
an arrest is made, officers usually use an “evidential breath test” at the police station.33  But, 
 
25 Harris, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 210; but see Richard Cowen, NJ to Impose New Penalties for Drunken Driving Starting 
Dec. 1: What You Need to Know, USA TODAY NETWORK, https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/2019/11/27/nj-
new-drunk-driving-law-take-effect-dec-1-heres-what-know/4275332002/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).  NJ eliminates 
license suspensions for most first-time offenders (those under a BAC of 0.15%) but requires convicted DWI drivers 
to install ignition locks.  Ignition locks require the motorist to have a BAC under 0.05% in order for the car to start. 
26 Id.  
27 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535–36.  The Supreme Court has called highway safety a compelling interest and paramount.  
The Court has referred to the aftermath of irresponsible driving as “slaughter comparable to the ravages of war.”  
Lastly, the Court has spoken of the “frequency of preventable collisions as tragic and astounding.”  Id. at 2536.      
28 Id. at 2535. 
29 Id. at 2536. 
30 Basics of Drunk and Drugged Driving: A DUI/DWI FAQ, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/drunk-
driving-dui-dwi-faq.html [hereinafter Basics of Drunk and Drugged Driving]. 
31 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016); See Alex Jefferson, How Do Alcohol Breathalyzers Work 
and How Accurate Are They?, PROCTOR CARS, http://www.proctorcars.com/how-do-alcohol-breathalyzers-work-and-
how-accurate-are-they/; Craig Freudenrich, How Breathalyzers Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/automotive/breathalyzer.htm. 
32 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2168 (stating that breathalyzers must be approved by the National Traffic Safety 
Administration). 
33 Basics of Drunk and Drugged Driving, supra note 30. 
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officers are sometimes put in a position where individuals refuse to submit to these breathalyzer 
tests, or the officer cannot obtain a proper reading because of the stupor of the motorist.  The 
remaining option becomes to administer a blood draw or urine test. 
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to be “secure in their persons . . . 
against unreasonable searches” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause.”34  The extraction of a blood sample is a highly effective means of measuring BAC.35  Yet, 
the Supreme Court has often ruled that blood sample tests are more invasive than breath tests and 
should require a warrant in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.36  “Such an invasion of bodily 
integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’”37  
Hence, the Supreme Court has usually stated that “precedent normally requires a warrant for a 
lawful search,” unless the search falls within a recognized exception.38 
While recognizing the government’s need for evidence, the Court has recognized only a 
few categorical instances under the exigent circumstances exception in which warrantless searches 
are acceptable.39  Thus, while the cognizable interest of public safety and collecting evidence have 
long been recognized, an individual’s right of their person has been equally, if not more important 
to the Court—until Mitchell.   
III. Pre-Mitchell DUI Criminal Procedure Law Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
35 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2536 (2019) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)). 
36 Id. at 2525; Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2160 (2016).  
37 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)); see also Skinner 
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
38 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2534; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148.  
39 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2547.  These are scenarios where officers: must enter a home to provide assistance to someone 
who is seriously injured; are in pursuit of a fleeing suspect; need to enter a burning building to extinguish a fire; or 
must prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.  Id.  
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 Before Mitchell, DUI criminal procedure law dictated certain results whether an individual 
was in the Fourth or Fifth Amendment realm.  While both Amendments purport to provide 
protection to those individuals suspected of DUIs, that is not necessarily the case.  And while 
defendants typically fared better under Fourth Amendment precedent because of the privacy 
interest at stake, the Court left open the question of just how important those privacy interests are.   
A. DUI and the Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment states that, “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law[.]”40  Under Fifth Amendment case law, individuals generally argued, albeit with little success, 
that being coerced to undergo blood tests by virtue of a statute (implied consent laws) or under the 
threat of penalty, violates their constitutional right against self-incrimination and due process.41  
The Court has usually held that the penalties imposed for refusing to undergo a blood draw in 
connection with a DUI arrest are legitimate.42 
1. The Right Against Self-Incrimination Vis-à-Vis “Coerced” Blood Test Results 
In Schmerber v. California, petitioner and a companion were drinking at a bar.43  Upon 
leaving, petitioner allegedly struck a tree with his vehicle, and when found by officers, was taken 
to the hospital for treatment.44  Both at the scene and in the hospital two hours later, the responding 
officer smelled liquor on the petitioner and observed other signs of inebriation.45  While petitioner 
received treatment for injuries sustained in the accident, the officer informed the petitioner that he 
 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
41 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2533. 
42 Id.  
43 384 U.S. 757, 758, n.2 (1966). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 769 (“[P]etitioner’s eyes were ‘bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance.’”).  
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was under arrest.46  Subsequently, the officer asked a nearby physician to withdraw a blood sample, 
despite petitioner’s refusal.47 
The Court was tasked to determine “whether the withdrawal of the blood and admission in 
evidence of the analysis involved in [the] case violated petitioner’s [Fifth Amendment] 
privilege.”48  The Court answered in the negative, stating the privilege “protects an accused only 
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood . . . in this case did not 
involve compulsion to those ends.”49  The Court did not disagree that the BAC evidence was 
invasively obtained through compulsion,50 but stated that “the privilege is implicated only when 
the person is guaranteed the right to ‘remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered 
exercise of his own will.’”51  Therefore, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
is a "bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a 
suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.’”52 
2. Drivers’ Refusal of a BAC Test is Allowed to be Used in Court 
Following Schmerber’s lead, the Court in South Dakota v. Neville similarly held that a 
defendant’s refusal to submit to a BAC test may be used against that individual in a court of law.53  
In Neville, police pulled the defendant over after he blew through a stop sign.54  The officers 
immediately perceived signs of intoxication and placed the defendant under arrest when he failed 
 
46 Id. at 758. 
47 Id. at 759. 
48 Id. at 761.  
49 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.  
50 Id. at 762 (“The withdrawal of blood necessarily involves puncturing the skin for extraction, and . . . is evidence of 
criminal guilt.”).   
51 Id. at 763 (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 764.  
53 459 U.S. 553 (1983).  
54 Id. at 554. 
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field sobriety tests. 55  When the officers asked the defendant to submit to a BAC test or lose his 
license for refusing, the defendant admitted he would not pass the test and refused multiple times.56   
South Dakota law stated that the refusal to submit to a BAC test may be admissible into 
evidence at the trial.57  Furthermore, South Dakota had enacted an implied consent law which 
deemed drivers to have consented to a chemical test of BAC if arrested for DWI.58  Having both 
statute and recent precedent to stand on, the Court held that “a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, 
after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not 
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.”59 
The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting “the use of ‘physical 
or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.”60  The state’s act (giving the 
defendant a choice to submit to testing or refuse and have his license suspended) did not rise to the 
level of coerced testimony.61  Hence, where a police officer has lawfully requested a blood-alcohol 
test without coercion, and a defendant refuses, the defendant will be unable to assert the privilege 
against self-incrimination in a subsequent court proceeding.62  
The Supreme Court’s rulings on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination do 
not bode well for defendants accused of DUIs when presented before a court of law.  Typically, as 
mentioned above, the Court does not construe physical evidence as testimonial.  Therefore, the 
state’s legitimate government interest in road safety, and the lack of testimonial evidence, 
 
55 Id. at 554–55. The defendant staggered and fell against his car, reeked of alcohol, and could not walk in a straight 
line. 
56 Id. at 555–56.   
57 Id. at 556. 
58 Id. at 559. 
59 Neville, 459 U.S. at 564.   
60 Id. at 562. 
61 Id. at 563 (“He could submit to self-accusation, or testify falsely (risking perjury) or decline to testify (risking 
contempt).  But the Court has long recognized that the Fifth Amendment prevents the State from forcing the choice 
of this ‘cruel trilemma’ on the defendant.”). 
62 Id. at 564.   
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outweigh an individual’s right to exclude the evidence of their own refusal.63  The Court narrowly 
read the Fifth Amendment to include only certain types of testimony, none of which included 
protections for DUI drivers.64  But the Court went in a different direction on the subject of an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches, specifically of their person.  
B. DUI and the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees an individual’s right to be “secure in their persons . . .  
against unreasonable searches” and further provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause.”65  Under Fourth Amendment case law, the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that blood draws constitute searches because they are intrusive in and of themselves.66  The Court 
has recognized that certain elements are necessary in order for a search warrant to be valid: law 
enforcement must have probable cause to request the warrant and a neutral magistrate judge must 
issue it.67  “The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and 
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”68 
But there are well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.  First, the “exigent 
circumstances” exception, which allows warrantless searches to prevent the imminent destruction 
of evidence, is most often discussed in the context of BAC testing.69  Exigent circumstances 
precedent requires a totality of the circumstances analysis on a case-by-case basis.70  Exigent 
circumstances usually relate to imminent danger, emergency, or the destruction of evidence, along 
 
63 See Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
64 Id.  
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
66 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767; Missouri v. McNeely, 569 
U.S. 141, 148 (2013). 
67 Timothy Andrea, Comment, The Exigencies of Drunk Driving: Cripps v. State and the Issues with Taking Drivers’ 
Blood Without a Warrant, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 482, 485 (2018).  
68 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.   
69 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (2019).   
70 Id. at 2533.   
 11 
with the inability to obtain a warrant.71  Aside from these scenarios, law enforcement may forego 
obtaining a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and delay 
would hinder the officer’s interest in preventing or investigating the alleged crime.72   
The Court has also applied the “search-incident-to-arrest” doctrine, which allows officers 
who are carrying out a lawful arrest to make a warrantless search of the arrestee’s person.73  Two 
distinct characteristics of the exception have been noted: a search may be made (1) of the person 
of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest; and (2) of the area within the control of the arrestee.74  
The search-incident-to-arrest exception does not require case-by-case adjudication, but instead, 
the lawful arrest alone justifies a full search of the person.75   
The analysis of the cases involving blood draws under the Fourth Amendment is relatively 
similar to the analysis under the Fifth Amendment: the Court (1) reviewed the factual scenario to 
determine if there was probable cause for the DUI; (2) determined whether there was time to secure 
a warrant or circumstances that would delay or prevent a law enforcement officer from obtaining 
one; and (3) then determined if the officer’s interest in obtaining evidence was sufficient to 
outweigh the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures.  Most 
of the time, the Court would find probable cause.  The difficulty in the assessment has usually 
turned on prongs two and three. 
1. Exigent Circumstances Case Law 
i. Schmerber v. California 
 
71 Id. at 2535 n.3 (“[W]e allow police to proceed without a warrant when an occupant of a home requires “emergency 
assistance,” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); when a building is on fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 
U.S. 499, 509 (1978); and when an armed robber has just entered a home, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 
(1976).”).  
72 Andrea, supra note 67, at 485. 
73 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016).   
74 Id. at 2175–76. 
75 Id. at 2176.   
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In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Schmerber both on Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
grounds.  As Part III(A)(1) of this Comment stated, the Court did not find the admission of the 
warrantless blood search into evidence as violative of an individual’s protection against self-
incrimination.76  As to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court faced the question of “whether the 
police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and 
procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonableness.”77  Although there certainly was probable cause for the arrest,78 the Court had to 
grapple with whether the officer was permitted to request the blood draw, or whether the officer 
should have secured a warrant first.79   
The Court approached the Fourth Amendment claim with particular concerns of an 
individual’s right to be secure in their persons.  The majority noted that search warrants are 
required for searches “where intrusions into the human body are concerned.  The requirement that 
a warrant be obtained is a requirement that the inferences to support the search ‘be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer . . . .”80  “The importance of 
informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another’s 
body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.”81   
In weighing the facts, the Court utilized a totality of the circumstances approach.  The facts 
revealed that the officer was delayed in arriving to the hospital where the petitioner was admitted 
because the scene of the underlying accident needed to be cleared.82  The officer was in a difficult 
 
76 See supra Part III(A)(0). 
77 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).   
78 Id. at 769 (“The police officer . . . smelled liquor on petitioner’s breath, and testified that petitioner’s eyes were 
‘bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance.’”). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 770. 
81 Id. (emphasis added). 
82 Id. at 770–71 (“[T]ime had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the 
accident[.]”). 
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position.  The Court held in the government’s favor, noting that in this particular case, the attempt 
to secure BAC evidence was proper.83  The fleeting evidence (dissipating percentage of alcohol)84 
coupled with the emergency (responding to the accident) 85 caused an exigent circumstance under 
the Fourth Amendment.  
It is important to note two things about this decision: (1) the Court reached its judgment 
“only on the facts of the present record;”86 and (2) it in no way indicates that the Constitution 
permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.87  The language stresses 
that the Court only reached the decision here because of the facts of this case.  Thus, the Justices 
may have gone the other way if the officer had not been delayed because of the accident he was 
investigating.  Lastly, both search-incident-to-arrest and exigent circumstances exception doctrine 
share the “threatened destruction of evidence” concern.  Thus, this Court’s characterization as “an 
appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest” is largely insignificant.   
ii. Missouri v. McNeely 
In 2013, the Court was faced with a similar Schmerber situation in Missouri v. McNeely, 
which involved a defendant who was speeding and swerving across a road’s center line before 
being pulled over by an officer.88  When the officer witnessed more signs of drunken stupor,89 he 
asked the defendant to perform field-sobriety tests, but the defendant refused to submit to a 
breathalyzer.90  After further refusal by the defendant, and without ever trying to obtain a warrant, 
the officer drove straight to the hospital for blood testing.91  The officer directed a hospital lab 
 
83 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772. 
84 Id. at 770.  
85 Id. at 771. 
86 Id. at 772. 
87 Id. (emphasis added).  
88 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).  
89 Id. (“The officer noticed . . . McNeely’s bloodshot eyes, his slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath.”). 
90 Id. at 145. 
91 Id. at 145–46. 
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technician to take a blood sample, and charged McNeely with DWI when the sample measured the 
defendant’s BAC as 0.154%.92  McNeely moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing 
that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment right when he took defendant’s blood without a 
warrant and without consent.93  The trial court agreed with the defendant.94  On appeal, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court.   
Missouri’s Supreme Court looked directly to Schmerber and recognized that lower courts 
must engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis when “determining whether exigency 
permits a nonconsensual, warrantless blood draw.”95  Furthermore, the Missouri Supreme Court 
concluded that Schmerber “requires more than the mere dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence to 
support a warrantless blood draw in an alcohol related case.”96  Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of “whether natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that suffices on its own to 
justify an exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving 
investigations.”97  The Court stressed that an invasion of person is readily apparent when a needle 
is shoved under the skin and into the veins.98  When such an invasion is present, there is significant 
importance in a “neutral and detached magistrate” to make the decision to proceed with the request 
 
92 Id. at 146.   
93 Id. at 146.  
94 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 146 (holding that there were no circumstances which the officer faced that he could not 
practicably obtain a warrant).  
95 Id. at 147.   
96 Id.  (“[E]xigency depends heavily on the existence of additional “special facts,” such as whether an officer was 
delayed by the need to investigate an accident and transport an injured suspect to the hospital . . .”). 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 148 (“[A]bsent an emergency, no less [than obtaining a search warrant] could be required where intrusions 
into the human body are concerned.”).  
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or not.99  Lastly, the Court stressed the importance of performing a totality of the circumstances 
analysis, stating that each case must be evaluated on its own facts.100 
In the present case, the Court noted that BAC evidence dissipates in a “gradual and 
relatively predictable” manner.101  Thus, the Court held, “in those drunk-driving investigations 
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without 
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they 
do so.”102  The Court recognized the important reality that officers can take steps to secure a 
warrant in an efficient and quick manner in today’s technologically advanced society.  First, an 
officer can attempt to secure a warrant while the suspect is being transported to a medical 
facility.103  Next, under the amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, magistrate judges may 
issue a warrant based on sworn testimony communicated over the phone or other reliable electronic 
means.104  Furthermore, jurisdictions have streamlined the warrant process by providing standard-
form warrant applications for drunk-driving investigations.105  The Court also mentioned that 
“experts can work backwards from the BAC at the time the sample was taken to determine the 
BAC at the time of the alleged offense.”106  The technological advancements have made it so police 
officers may secure warrants more quickly, while leaving the assessment of exigency in the hands 
of a neutral magistrate judge, as past precedent has always required. 
 
99 Id. 
100 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 150–51 (“[O]ur judgment [in the Schmerber case] that there had been no Fourth Amendment 
violation was strictly based on the facts of the present record.”). 
101 Id. at 153 (emphasis added).  The trial court heard testimony which indicated that an individual’s blood typically 
decreases by “approximately 0.015 percent to 0.02 percent per hour once the alcohol has been fully absorbed.”  Id. at 
152. 
102 Id. at 152 (emphasis added).  
103 Id. at 153.   
104 Id. at 154. See also id. at 154 n.4; Fed. R. Crim Pro. 4.1.  
105 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 155.   
106 Id. at 156.  
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Lastly, the Court recognized that although there is a need to secure such evidence, states 
have enacted laws—namely implied consent laws—that provide penalties for a driver’s refusal to 
submit to BAC testing.107  As noted under Fifth Amendment precedent, states may use a driver’s 
refusal to submit to a BAC test as evidence in court and may even revoke or suspend the alleged 
drunk driver’s license.  The Court also noted that a “majority of [s]tates either place significant 
restrictions on when police officers may obtain a blood sample despite a suspect’s refusal . . . or 
prohibit nonconsensual blood tests altogether.”108  Evidence suggests that in states that permit 
nonconsensual blood testing pursuant to a warrant, their use reduces “breath-test-refusal rates and 
improve[s] law enforcement’s ability to recover BAC evidence.”109  In weighing the totality of the 
circumstances, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the 
bloodstream presents no per se exigency to justify a blood test without a warrant.110 
2. Search-Incident-to-Arrest Case Law  
In 2016, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception provides a mechanism by which officers may force individuals suspected of DUIs to 
submit to blood sample draws.111  In Birchfield, the petitioner drove his car off of a highway and 
into a ditch.112  Upon seeing the petitioner struggle to back out of the ditch, a state trooper 
approached his car and recognized the telltale signs of drunkenness: strong scents of alcohol, 
 
107 Id. at 160–61.  All fifty states “have enacted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating 
a motor vehicle within the States, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of 
a drunk-driving offense.”  People v. Harris, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 210 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2015); 
see also Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2531.   
108 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 161–62 and ensuing footnotes. 
109 Id. at 162.   
110 Id. at 165.   
111 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).  
112 Id. at 2170.   
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bloodshot and watery eyes, and slurred speech.113  The officer then administered a breathalyzer 
test with the consent of petitioner, which read a BAC of 0.254%, over three times the legal limit.114 
Officers ordinarily do not use road-side breathalyzer tests for evidentiary purposes, so the 
responding officer advised the petitioner of his obligation under North Dakota law to undergo 
further BAC testing.115  The petitioner refused to agree to a blood draw, and subsequently plead 
guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the refusal statute.116  In the trial court, petitioner argued that 
the Fourth Amendment prohibited criminalizing his refusal to submit to the blood draw.117  The 
trial court rejected this argument, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.118 
Under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment for BAC testing, 
the Court balanced the need for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests versus an 
individual’s right against intrusion into their privacy.119  In deciding the case, the Supreme Court 
stressed, as it has in the exigent circumstances exception realm, that BAC tests (whether through 
breath or blood) are searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.120  The Court also 
distinguished the differences in breath and blood tests.  Breath tests implicate fewer privacy 
concerns because: (1) they are not intrusive (an individual only blows into a tube); (2) only reveal 
one piece of information (the amount of alcohol in the subject’s breath); and (3) blowing into a 
tube is not an experience likely to cause any further embarrassment inherent in any arrest.121  To 
the contrary, blood tests do implicate privacy concerns because: (1) they require piercing of the 
skin and extraction of a part of an individual’s body, and (2) the sample gives law enforcement 
 
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 2170–71.   
117 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2171. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 2176. 
120 Id. at 2173.   
121 Id. at 2177. 
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authorities information that can provide details outside of the scope of the drunk-driving arrest.122  
The Court also noted that states and the federal government have already imposed numerous 
measures to deter potential drunk drivers.123   
The reality is that police officers often face quick judgment calls that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require to be broken down and logged in a specific manner.124  States, 
rightfully so, are concerned with evidence being lost because of the often difficult decisions that 
officers need to make—tend to the situation at hand versus trying to secure a warrant.  With these 
governmental concerns in the forefront, the Court proceeded to discuss the need for warrants.  
Warrants protect privacy in two ways: (1) “[T]hey ensure that a search is not carried out unless a 
neutral magistrate makes an independent determination that there is probable cause to believe that 
evidence will be found; and (2) if probable cause is found by the magistrate, the warrant “limits 
the intrusion on privacy by specifying the scope of the search.”125   
In evaluating whether the blood draw was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court stressed that the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not depend on an evaluation of the 
threat of evidence loss in a particular case.126  Instead, the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine is 
limited by the nature of the privacy interest at stake.127  Thus, the Court concluded that BAC testing 
of drunk-driving suspects under the search-incident-to-arrest exception permits a warrantless 
breath test, but not blood test.128  The privacy concerns of individuals implicated by breath tests is 
minimal, while the states’ interest in the BAC test is great.129  Yet, “[b]lood tests are significantly 
 
122 Id. at 2178. 
123 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2166–70.   
124 Id. at 2179.   
125 Id. at 2181. 
126 Id. at 2183. 
127 Id.; see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 374 (2014). 
128 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.   
129 Id.  
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more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less 
invasive alternative of a breath test.”130 
The Court made one final conclusion that will become the basis of this Comment:  
It is true that a blood test . . . may be administered to a person who is unconscious 
. . . or who is unable to do what is needed to take a breath test[.]  But we have no 
reason to believe that such situations are common in drunk-driving arrests, and 
when they arise, the police may apply for a warrant if need be.131   
 
The Court foresaw that there may come a time where a breath test is impossible and a blood draw 
might be necessary, but a warrant still should be sought.  Thus, the Court has still not provided a 
categorical exception when it comes to blood draws at this time, even after Mitchell. 
C. Prior Case Law and How the Court has Discussed Exigent Circumstances, Intrusions, and 
Government Interests 
 
The aforementioned case law demonstrates that the Court, in its discussion of the relevant 
Fourth Amendment protections, focused primarily on the right of individuals to be protected 
against unwarranted intrusion by the state132 versus the need for law enforcement to secure 
evidence to determine what is reasonable.  Thus far, the Supreme Court has regularly stated that 
“precedent normally requires a warrant for a lawful search,” unless the search falls within a 
recognized exception.133  The Court has especially opined that in the context of blood draws, “such 
an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted 
expectations of privacy.’”134  In sum, the Court’s language implies that unwanted blood draws are 
 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 2184–85 (emphasis added).   
132 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).  
133 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (2019); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013).   
134 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148 (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).  See also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).   
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extremely problematic because of their invasiveness.135  This was true in both the search-incident-
to-arrest exception and the exigent circumstances case law.   
Further, the warrant requirement is not just a mere formality, but serves important 
purposes.  Search warrants protect privacy in two main ways.  Since the invasion into another’s 
body in search of evidence of guilt is great, the importance of requiring authorization by a neutral 
and detached magistrate is indisputable.136  This is further supported by the fact that an officer is 
often engaged in the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”137  Thus, having a neutral 
magistrate make an independent determination that probable cause exists to believe that evidence 
will be found is an important protection against unreasonable searches.138  Secondly, if probable 
cause is found, the warrant would limit the “intrusion on privacy by specifying the scope of the 
search—that is, the area that can be searched and the items that can be sought.”139  The warrant 
requirement ensures that our rights as individuals are protected to the fullest extent possible. 
Even more telling is the fact that warrants have become easier to secure now.  As Missouri 
v. McNeely recognized, federal magistrate judges may issue warrants based on sworn testimony 
communicated over the phone or other reliable electronic means.140  A majority of states now allow 
officers or prosecutors “to apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including 
telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail and video 
conferencing.”141  Warrants can now be secured in as little as five to fifteen minutes, suggesting 
the cases where exigency is actually compelling are few.142  
 
135 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 159 (“We have never retreated . . . from our recognition that any compelled intrusion into 
the human body implicates significant, constitutionally protected privacy interests.”) (emphasis added).  
136 Id. at 148; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
137 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)).  
138 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2181 (2016).   
139 Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).  
140 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154 (citing Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 4.1). 
141 Id. and accompanying n.4. 
142 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2548 (2019). 
 21 
Lastly, the Court has accounted for the government’s interest in securing evidence to 
convict individuals of the alleged crime they have committed.  Without evidence that will stand 
up in the court of law (accurate BAC measurements), the government will have a lesser chance to 
convict the accused.143  This is especially important given that the percentage of alcohol in an 
individual’s body decreases from the moment they stop drinking.144  The need to keep roadways 
safe against the evils of DUI is another key factor.145   
Therefore, the Court has always addressed an individual’s right to privacy against 
unwarranted searches and seizures as vital.  The Court has stopped short of saying that blood draws 
are acceptable under a searches-incident-to-arrest exception because the blood draw intrudes on 
an individual’s liberty.146  In the exigent circumstances line of cases, the Court has consistently 
called for a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether the officer indeed had no 
time to secure a warrant.147  Search warrants have long been held to protect the rights of 
individuals, and this is no different in the blood draw line of cases.  But what the Court had not yet 
addressed was whether the privacy interest is so significant that mandating a blood draw is 
consistent with precedent, or treads in new territory. 
IV. The Mitchell v. Wisconsin Decision and its Implications 
The story of Mitchell is similar to every DUI case discussed thus far: a motorist is detained 
by law enforcement, the responding officer witnesses signs of inebriation, and subsequently 
attempts to secure BAC evidence for a conviction.  But this time, there was no victory for the 
driver who attempted to get the unconsented blood draw results suppressed.  This section will 
 
143 See id. at 2536. 
144 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). 
145 See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
146 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). 
147 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).  
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focus on the sharp contrast between the plurality, the concurrence, and the dissent, and the 
important takeaways from all sides.  
A. Facts of Mitchell 
A Sheboygan Police Department officer received a tip that petitioner Mitchell appeared to 
be drunk upon climbing into his vehicle and driving off.148  Upon finding Mitchell near a lake, the 
officer noticed that Mitchell was showing the suggestive signs of intoxication: slurred speech, 
stumbling movement, and the inability to stand upright without the help of two responding 
officers.149  After Mitchell’s preliminary breathalyzer test recorded a BAC level of 0.24%, he was 
arrested and was to be driven to the police station for an evidentiary grade breathalyzer.150 
As the officers began to transport Mitchell, they realized that his condition was worsening.  
By the time they reached the station, Mitchell could not even take the necessary breath test.151  As 
Mitchell’s condition further deteriorated, the officers decided to head to the hospital for a blood 
test.152  Mitchell then lost consciousness and had to be wheeled into the hospital.153  Nevertheless, 
the officer read Mitchell the rights of refusal statements associated with Wisconsin’s implied 
consent law and upon hearing no response, asked hospital staff to administer the blood draw, which 
produced a BAC of 0.222%.154  Notably, this reading was done ninety minutes after his arrest.155 
Mitchell was ultimately charged and convicted of violating two drunk-driving provisions, 
which he challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds against unreasonable searches, stating that 
the blood draw was conducted without his consent and without a warrant.156  Mitchell argued, to 
 
148 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (2019). 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
153 Id.  




no avail, that the BAC evidence should have been suppressed.157  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether a statute 
authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth  
Amendment warrant requirement.”158 
B. The Plurality’s Opinion Produces a Puzzling “Almost Always” Test 
The plurality started its analysis by stating that past decisions have been based on the 
“precedent regarding the specific constitutional claims in each case, while keeping in mind the 
wider regulatory scheme developed over the years to combat drunk driving.”159  This signals that 
the plurality does not view Mitchell as necessary falling into the exigent circumstances or search-
incident-to-arrest doctrines.  Specifically, in Part II of the Mitchell opinion, the Supreme Court 
goes through case law primarily centered on the Fifth Amendment, where it has approved of 
enforcing BAC tests promoted by implied consent laws.  But, as discussed in Part III(A) and III(B) 
of this Comment, there was a vast difference in the outcomes for petitioners in the Fifth versus 
Fourth Amendment cases.160   
While admitting in Part II of Mitchell’s opinion that “precedent normally requires a warrant 
for a lawful search,” the Court noted there are “well-defined exceptions to this rule.”161  The Court 
quickly mentioned Birchfield as a case where the search-incident-to-arrest exception to BAC 
testing was applied, and where the Court ultimately held that a drunk-driving arrest taken alone 
will justify a warrantless breath test, but not a blood test.162  The Court then moved on to McNeely, 
where it held that the exigent circumstances exception allows warrantless searches to “prevent the 
 
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 2533. 
160 See supra Part III(A) & (B). 
161 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2533. 
162 Id. 
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imminent destruction of evidence;” however, the “fleeting quality of BAC evidence alone” was 
not enough.163  So far, so good for petitioner.   
Then, the plurality discussed Schmerber, where it held that a blood test was justified when 
a delay would threaten the destruction of evidence and pressing needs (i.e. safety, health, etc.) were 
extant.164  That case, as discussed, was based solely on its own facts.  The Supreme Court’s 
plurality opinion in Mitchell nonetheless found that this case was similar to Schmerber on the 
spectrum of exception cases, in that Mitchell’s drunken stupor and unconsciousness created a 
medical condition that needed to be treated with urgency.165  Furthermore, his intoxicated state 
“deprived officials of a reasonable opportunity to administer a [standard evidentiary] breath 
test.”166  The relevant question then becomes, what is an officer to do when a driver’s stupor 
“eliminates any reasonable opportunity for that kind of breath test.”167 
But in Part III of the opinion, the plurality shifted its analysis and focused on the broader 
regulatory scheme, defined as the government’s interest in protecting roads from unsafe drivers.  
“Highway safety is a vital public interest.”168  The Court harped on the point that alcohol-related 
accidents have taken roughly 10,000 to 20,000 lives per year since 1982169 and recognized that the 
BAC limits adopted by every state have decreased over the years to the 0.08% limit currently.170  
 
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 2533. 
167 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2534. 
168 Id. at 2535. The Court goes on to mention that it has called highway safety both a compelling and paramount 
interest.  It goes further by saying that “[t]wice we have referred to the effects of irresponsible driving as ‘slaughter’ 
comparable to the ravages of war . . . .  The frequency of preventable collisions . . . is ‘tragic’ and ‘astounding.’” Id. 
at 2535–36 (internal citations omitted). 
169 Id. at 2536 (“In the best years, that would add up to more than one fatality per hour.”). 
170 Id. This is down from the initial limit of 0.15%. 
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States have also enacted penalties for drivers who exceed a higher BAC threshold, which the Court 
opined has led to a decrease in the number of annual fatalities.171   
Enforcing BAC limits requires a test that will stand up in court, and blood samples are a 
“highly effective means of measuring the influence of alcohol.”172  The Court stated that testing 
must be done promptly because “it is a biological certainty that alcohol dissipates from the 
bloodstream at a rate of 0.01 percent to 0.025 percent per hour.”173  Lastly, the Court claimed that 
when a driver becomes unconscious, blood tests are “essential for achieving the compelling 
interests described above.”174  The Court’s plurality creates a fork in the road; does the case truly 
drive towards the exigent circumstances line of cases, or, does the plurality try to bucket Mitchell 
in both an exigent circumstances and a regulatory reasonableness style analysis?  
In order to reach its conclusion, the Court related this case to Schmerber, which follows 
the premise that “exigency exists when: (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor 
creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant 
application.”175  The Court then said that unconsciousness not only creates a pressing need but is 
itself a medical emergency.176  To the plurality, it is possible that officers may have to provide 
other assistance when responding to a drunk-driving related incident, and thus, we cannot put 
officers in a position to “choose between prioritizing a warrant application to the detriment of 
critical health and safety needs, and delaying the warrant application, and thus the BAC test, to the 
 
171 Id.  (“From the mid-1970’s to the mid-1980’s, ‘the number of annual fatalities averaged 25,000; by 2014 . . ., the 
number had fallen to below 10,000.”). 
172 Id. at 2536. 
173 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2536. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 2537 (emphasis added). 
176 Id. at 2537–38 (“[T]he suspect will have to be rushed to the hospital or similar facility not just for the blood test 
itself but for urgent medical care.  Police can reasonably anticipate that such a driver might require monitoring, 
positioning, and support on the way to the hospital . . . and that immediate medical treatment could delay (or otherwise 
distort the results of) a blood draw conducted later, upon receipt of a warrant, thus reducing its evidentiary value.”). 
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detriment of its evidentiary value and all the compelling interests served by BAC limits.”177  
Although the Court accepted the proposition that technology has made warrant applications much 
quicker, it further opined that the time to secure a warrant has not disappeared.178   
The Court ostensibly hinged its holding on the compelling interests of the government:  
When police have probable cause to believe a person has committed a drunk-
driving offense and the driver’s unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken 
to a hospital or similar facility before police have a reasonable opportunity to 
administer a standard evidentiary breath test, they may almost always order a 
warrantless blood test to measure the driver’s BAC without offending the Fourth 
Amendment.179   
 
But, the Court did not rule out the possibility that “a defendant would be able to show that his 
blood would not have been drawn if police had not been seeking BAC information, and that police 
could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing 
needs or duties.”180 
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence Calls for a Categorical Exception  
On the other hand, Justice Thomas viewed the plurality’s rule as “difficult-to-administer” 
and stated, “[e]xigent circumstances are generally present when police encounter a person 
suspected of drunk driving—except when they aren’t.”181  His Honor opined that “it will 
nevertheless burden both officers and courts who must attempt to apply it.”182  Instead, Justice 
Thomas called for a per se rule, which posited that regardless of the driver’s consciousness, the 
natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream alone creates an exigency once the police 
 
177 Id. at 2538 (“Police [officers] may have to ensure that others who are injured receive prompt medical attention; 
they may have to provide first aid themselves . . . they may have to deal with fatalities . . . [or] preserve evidence at 
the scene and block or redirect traffic to prevent further accidents.”). 
178 Id. at 2539.   
179 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. 
180 Id.  
181 Id.  
182 Id.  
 27 
have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk.183  Justice Thomas’s route, if that of the majority 
in the future, would modify Birchfield to create a much more lenient standard for officers, giving 
them carte blanche to execute blood draws at any reasonable suspicion of inebriation.   
The concurrence admitted that Fourth Amendment case law has required that a warrant 
must generally be secured, but stated that the imminent destruction of evidence is at risk in every 
single drunk-driving arrest, which implicates the exigent circumstances doctrine.184  Thus, 
according to Justice Thomas, the per se rule would not undermine the totality of the circumstances 
analysis endorsed by McNeely and Birchfield because a certain, dispositive fact is always present 
in DUI cases—destruction of evidence vis-à-vis metabolization of alcohol.185  Lastly, Justice 
Thomas took one last jab at the plurality by concluding its rule was “more likely to confuse than 
clarify” because officers and courts will be burdened by the plurality’s rebuttable presumption.186   
D. The Scathing Dissent 
The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by two other Justices, attacks the 
plurality’s proposition that police will be forced to choose between an emergency situation and 
securing evidence.  Pointing to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Sotomayor stated that when there 
is time to secure a warrant, one must be sought.187  To the dissent, the fact that Wisconsin admitted 
that the officer had time secure a warrant to draw Mitchell’s blood should have ended the 
inquiry.188  The dissent further harped that Wisconsin did not even argue that this was an exigent 
 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 2540. 
185 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2541. 
186 Id. at 2539, 2541.  Justice Thomas’s concern has already come to light.  See People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, 
*P65 n.7 (Ill. Dec. 5, 2019) (requesting clarification on the rebuttable presumption). 
187 Id.  However, there are other warrantless exceptions that have nothing to do with time.  See, e.g., Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 
38, 42–43 (1976). 
188 Id.  Between transporting Mitchell to the hospital and the blood draw, 90 minutes elapsed, and at no point was an 
attempt to secure a warrant made.  Id. at 2541–42. 
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circumstances exception case, but instead, claimed that the blood draw was lawful because of the 
implied consent statute.189   
After describing the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees, the dissent stated that “[t]he warrant 
requirement is not a mere formality; it ensures that necessary judgment calls are made ‘by a neutral 
and detached magistrate,’ not by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime.”190  A warrant ensures that a police officer is not made to be the sole interpreter of the 
Constitution’s protections.191  According to the dissent, it is only when an exception applies that 
law enforcement will not violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment right.192  Justice Sotomayor 
opined, “For decades, this Court has stayed true to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
. . . even in the face of attempts categorically to exempt blood testing from its protections.”193 
Had precedent been followed, the answer would have been straightforward.  In Schmerber, 
the exigent circumstances justified the search because of the unusual delay of the investigation by 
the responding officer, which provided no time to seek a warrant.194  In McNeely, the Court ruled 
that blood tests are not categorically exempt from the warrant requirement, and instead, each case 
must be determined on its own facts (as was Schmerber).195  Chief Justice Roberts stated there that 
“the Fourth Amendment mandates officers to obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be 
 
189 Id. at 2542. 
190 Id. at 2543 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)). 
191 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2543. 
192 Id.  The dissent mentions the exigent circumstances exception, the consent exception (voluntary consent), and the 
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drawn.”196  In Birchfield, the Court again rejected a categorical attempt to exempt blood draws 
from the warrant requirement in relation to the searches-incident-to-arrest doctrine.197 
Thus, the dissent said, Mitchell should have been resolved squarely by past precedent.  
Unless time did not permit an officer from obtaining a warrant, they must get one before ordering 
a blood draw.198  Just seven years ago, McNeely reiterated the standard necessary to resolve DUI 
cases involving exigent circumstances.  There, the Court made many points that are even more 
relevant today.  First, blood draws are different than the categorical approaches that the Court has 
allowed in the past in “destruction of evidence” cases,199 namely because there are inherent delays 
when an officer seeks a blood test, regardless of whether or not a warrant is obtained.200  Police 
officers will almost always have to transport an individual to the hospital or medical facility for a 
medical professional to draw blood.  That in itself may give officers time to seek a warrant.201 
According to the dissent, “[E]xperts can work backwards from the BAC at the time the 
sample was taken to determine the BAC at the time of the alleged offense.”202  Magistrate judges 
may issue warrants through sworn testimony over the phone or other means, which has sped up 
the process to the point where judges can issue warrants in five to fifteen minutes.203  Lastly, and 
maybe most importantly, BAC dissipates gradually and predictably.204  These facts, relevant in 
McNeely, are even more pertinent now with our ever advancing society. 
 
196 Id.; Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141,173 (2013) (“If there is time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn, 
the police must seek one.”) (emphasis added).  
197 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2544.  
198 Id. at 2544–45.  
199 Id. at 2547–48.  These are scenarios where police officers are just outside the door to a home and evidence is about 
to be destroyed; or a person is about to become injured; or a fire has broken out. 
200 Id. at 2548. 
201 Id.  
202 Id. at 2548. 
203 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2548.  
204 Id.  
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This analysis leads back to the very important point that Schmerber and McNeely advocated 
for in the first place—the fact that not every case will be the same, and each will require a holistic 
assessment.205  In many scenarios, as in Mitchell itself, the police will have enough time to secure 
a warrant and address the medical needs of an individual prior to the evidence dissipating.206  Thus, 
the dissent opined that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as well as past precedent, 
dictates that officers must seek a warrant prior to attempting to draw blood from a person suspected 
of drunk driving.207  The plurality’s decision takes away the police’s heavy burden to justify a 
warrantless search to one of only urgent need.208 
V. Mitchell v. Wisconsin Creates a Fork in the Road on Where it Sits in DUI Case Law 
Other than the confusing “almost always” rule that comes out of Mitchell, the opinion is 
also dissimilar to the Court’s pronouncements in the cases mentioned in Section III of this 
Comment.  The Court has consistently refused to categorically include blood draws under the 
exigent circumstance or search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment, yet Mitchell 
goes the other way when the driver is unconscious.209 
A. Which Road Should Lower Courts Travel: The Regulatory Reasonableness or Exigent 
Circumstances Road? 
 
The plurality started off by analyzing Fourth Amendment precedent and what is required 
when assessing claims.210  The opinion could have been decided on these grounds alone under the 
exigent circumstances exception doctrine.  But the Court decided to go further and in Section III 
of the opinion,211 and weighed the interests of the government in addressing the larger regulatory 
 
205 Id. at 2550. 
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208 Id. at 2551. 
209 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013); Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
210 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533 (2019). 
211 Id. at 2534–39. 
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problem—unsafe public roads due to impaired drivers.  With the bifurcated opinion, the question 
becomes whether DUI case law is about exigent circumstances or truly about keeping roads safe.  
The difference is imperative in deciding whether we resolve future cases on public policy grounds 
or stick to the traditional analysis.  For lower courts, the question becomes, which part of the 
opinion control?212   
There is an inherent question of deference when deciding cases using the traditional 
analysis (exigent circumstances) versus public policy grounds (keeping roads safe).  It suffices to 
say that the latter is more deferential to law enforcement, similar to rational basis review of 
constitutionality.  With the bifurcated opinion, the plurality makes it tough to follow what the basis 
was for its ultimate decision: exigent circumstances or the need for law enforcement officers to 
respond to situations without further endangering the public.  Justice Alito seemingly harped on 
the idea that officers cannot be forced to choose between attempting to procure a warrant versus 
attending to the needs at hand.213 
Of course, not all searches are violative of the Fourth Amendment—only those that are 
unreasonable.214  Time and time again the Court has held that a blood draw is intrusive in and of 
itself.215  The Court has also stated that BAC evidence dissipating, alone, is never enough for the 
exigency circumstance exception to apply.216  In stark contrast to past precedent, the Mitchell Court 
decided that the elements of public safety and government enforcement of DUI laws were enough 
 
212 In a similar case, the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, Division Five, similarly followed the 
Supreme Court’s path for regulating road safety before ultimately concluding that exigent circumstances existed.  
See State v. Gray, No. ED104743-01, 2019 WL 5381873, at *6-7 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2019) (stating that BAC 
tests “are needed to enforce laws that save lives”). 
213 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct.  at 2538; Nina Totenberg & Bill Chappell, Supreme Court Affirms Police Can Draw Blood 
From Unconscious Drivers, NPR (June 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/27/732852170/supreme-court-
affirms-police-can-draw-blood-from-unconscious-drivers. 
214 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173. 
215 See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. 2525; Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2160; McNeely, 569 U.S. 141; Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757. 
216 McNeely, 569 U.S. 141. 
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to cross the line of reasonableness to circumvent an individual’s constitutionally-protected right 
against unreasonable searches.217  The Court’s statistical analysis of drunk driving incidents in the 
United States put the nail in the coffin in its ruling, making it known that a drunk driver is not 
considered on equal footing as others.218  The statistical analysis is used as a guidepost to show 
that the Court was driven by public policy, something that it had not necessarily relied upon in 
previous DUI exigent circumstances case law.  The plurality opinion is paradigmatic in this 
respect: DUI case law is no longer exclusively within the province of warrantless exceptions 
analysis; instead, it is now underneath a broader umbrella that purely assesses reasonableness. 
The plurality had a relatively easy route to conclude the same way without focusing on the 
implications of road safety.  The Court discussed the exigent circumstances exception and posited 
that unconsciousness is a medical emergency within itself.219  Fleeting evidence due to the 
emergency created by the unconsciousness would provide the requisite combination to satisfy DUI 
exigent circumstances precedent.  This would also follow the holistic analysis that is central to 
every exigent circumstance case.  While still problematic because of the distinctions with 
Schmerber,220 this route could have achieved the same result without the doctrinal confusion.  
B.  Trying to Apply Mitchell to New Facts 
 If the facts of Mitchell are changed just nominally, it becomes difficult to determine how a 
reviewing court should rule on a defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge.  Take, for example, 
the following scenario.  First, assume that Mitchell is still visibly inebriated.  He then gets in his 
van, turns it on, turns on the heat, pulls the seat back in recline, and starts to doze off.  A bar patron 
 
217 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535–36. 
218 Id. at 2536. 
219 Id. at 2537. 
220 Id. at 2543.  The holding is troubling because Wisconsin admitted that the officer never attempted to secure a 
warrant even though he had ample time to.  This makes the connection to Schmerber more distant because law 
enforcement there was delayed from obtaining evidence by a few hours since the officer was responding to an accident 
caused by the petitioner.    
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who noticed Mitchell leave, now sees him in the vehicle and decides to call for help.  When officers 
respond, they tap on the window to inquire further.   
The officers observe that Mitchell is falling in and out of consciousness, so they decide to 
request a breathalyzer test.  Since Mitchell is incapable of blowing into the breathalyzer, the 
officers take him directly to an urgent care for a blood draw.  Although Mitchell does not consent 
to the blood draw, the officers, relying on Mitchell v. Wisconsin, go ahead and order one anyway.  
How should a defense attorney proceed?  More importantly, how should the court decide the case?   
If Mitchell’s attorney argues that Mitchell’s blood draw should be suppressed under the 
regulatory road of the plurality’s opinion, Mitchell would lose before he steps foot in court.  The 
line of thought here goes, the arrest and ensuing blood draw were both proper because Mitchell 
was a danger to the public when he entered his vehicle.  It was paramount that officers kept him 
off the road, even though he was not yet driving, to ensure that no one would possibly become 
another statistical victim of another DUI accident.  Furthermore, since Mitchell was clearly 
inebriated and falling in and out of consciousness, and could not perform a breathalyzer test, the 
only way to secure evidence was through a blood draw.  The court, for the sake of efficiency and 
following the spirit of Mitchell’s opinion, would be inclined to take this route as well.   
An entirely more difficult analysis proceeds from the second, more windy, exigent 
circumstances exception road.  Defense counsel would prefer this route because the government 
must show more than keeping roads safe.  The Mitchell Court reaffirms that the natural dissipation 
of alcohol is not enough to trigger a blood draw under the exigent circumstances prong.  Therefore, 
the reviewing court would have to rely on Mitchell’s condition when the officers approached him.  
Although he was deemed to be falling in and out of consciousness, there could be numerous 
explanations for such.  It could have been just because of the heat in his vehicle.  It could have 
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been because he was too drunk.  The analysis would be more difficult because it would hinge on 
whether evidence needed to be secured (because it was dissipating) and whether a pressing need 
took priority over a warrant application.  While the government could easily show the first prong 
was satisfied, the “pressing need” prong becomes murky.  If the court holds a pressing need was 
non-existent, would it, like Mitchell, add a public policy argument to prevent the defendant from 
getting off scot-free?  The difficulty, even in a scenario with slight factual changes, shows that this 
case was decided in a manner that can lead to confusion, and needs to be clarified moving forward.   
VI. Conclusion 
The dissent’s opinion has an important message that applies sensibly in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment: if there is time for a warrant, one should be secured.221  Warrants are important 
for numerous reasons and the Court has consistently advised that BAC testing should be left in the 
hands of neutral and detached magistrates, so as to not leave law enforcement as the sole 
interpreters of the Constitution’s protections.222  Today, there should be more focus on an 
individual’s right to privacy and to be free from searches.  Mitchell permits future courts reviewing 
DUI cases to apply a highly deferential standard—related to keeping the roads safe.  That was not 
the intention of the Fourth Amendment and should not be the case today.  
Regardless of where one surmises Mitchell fits in DUI case law, it is clear that the Court 
has expanded the exigent circumstances DUI doctrine to cast a wider net for the government to 
prosecute offenders under one of two avenues. The opinion currently creates an ironic hangover 
in that defense attorneys, courts, and law enforcement officers, will be unsure of which fork in the 
road will be the proper route to journey on.  In order to clarify the confusion, the Court will need 
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to clearly define whether future DUI cases are subject to the traditional analysis consisting of the 
exigent circumstances exception, or whether the cases should be assessed in light of the 
government’s need to remove drunk drivers from the road as a matter of public safety.   
 
